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Abstract: Susan M. Turner (2005) has argued that the use of animal analogs ought to
be considered categorically unethical on deontological, or rights-grounds, and that
some but not all animal analogs are unethical on utilitarian grounds. I claim, on the
contrary, that the use of most, if not all animal analogs can be justified from both the
utilitarian and animal rights perspectives. Indeed, I believe that a convincing case is
to be made for the thesis that animal analogs ought to be promoted actively, on
ethical grounds. I hold this to be true of both food and clothing replacement analogs,
although I agree with Turner’s categorical condemnation of secondhand animal skin.
I also hold that the general question of the preference for animal analogs over their
original flesh and skin-based inspirations raises important questions about the
relationship between ethics and aesthetics. I examine these in sympathy with the
moderate aestheticist claims that some degree of distinction between these two
spheres of value is desirable, and that the sublimation of powerful and problematical
urges is normally preferable to their suppression.

Introduction
Susan M. Turner[1] raises several interesting questions surrounding the
consumption and display of what I will henceforth term “animal analogs”—products
that simulate the perceptual properties of animal-based commodities. These products
can be divided into two categories: food analogs e.g. seitan and tofu, and clothing
analogs, mainly synthetic fur and synthetic leather. The justifying reasons for their use
are variable, and one of the primary sets of justifications is ethical. By that I mean the
desire, for reasons of taste or aesthetics, to continue using products with perceptual

Between the Species VI August 2006 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

2
qualities (e.g. a look, feel, smell and/or taste) similar to animal-based commodities
without causing animal suffering, rights violations, or slaughter Other sets of reasons
for using animal analogs include, in the case of food analogs, their alleged greater
healthfulness and their compliance with other systems of dietary law. Lower cost is
sometimes a third reason, in the case of clothing analogs. Neither the first nor the
third of these reasons will figure in this piece, but the second will receive brief
attention. The focus in this article will be the use of animal analogs for primarily
ethical reasons, and the interface between ethics and aesthetics that their use
highlights.

My central thesis is to claim, contra Turner, that the manufacture and
consumption of animal analogs is certainly justified. Indeed, I would wish to claim
that such products, if they decrease the manufacture and consumption of their animalbased inspirations, are valuable commodities for satisfying strong human preferences
while reducing animal deaths and suffering. I want to maintain that this claim can be
upheld on the two principal approaches to defending animal welfare examined by
Turner: the rights and utilitarian perspectives. I will also argue that morally
controversial simulacra or representations of the aesthetic and perceptual qualities of
sentient beings should not be normally subject to a stern moralism in aesthetics that
denies any autonomy to the creative production and consumption of artefacts. It
seems apparent that the arts, including applied arts like food as well as fashion design
and production, can either diminish suffering greatly and/or provide a sort of
sublimation for powerful but ethically dubious desires. Therefore, as disagreeable as
the perceptual properties of some analogical artefacts may be to some, their benefits
as simulacra ought to take precedence in their ethical evaluation. I hope that Turner’s

Between the Species VI August 2006 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

3
thought-provoking piece as well as this article will help to stimulate further
examination of this under-discussed issue.

Rights, Utility, and Consequences

I would like to begin by examining what I take to be several of the fundamental
claims and arguments in Turner’s piece, focussing on what I see as some key aspects
of her reading of both the rights and utilitarian implications of using animal-based
commodities and their analogs. Although it would be beyond the parameters of this
piece to offer a general elaboration and justification of my own views on animals and
ethics, I will come clean philosophically here in the interests of clarifying my vantage
point. I am sympathetic to a virtue-based approach to ethics, with an attendant notion
of rights linked to species-characteristic levels of consciousness and allowing for
degrees of moral complexity.

I take this perspective on the animals issue to be broadly anthropocentric, nonabsolutist, and a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism.[2] By that I mean that our
attitudes and beliefs about animals are to be situated in the context of our overall
social practices, and that rights are not absolutes that are unconnected to behavioural
consequences. The assessment of consequences is best accomplished, in my view, not
by an aggregative analysis of choice, but by a combination of empirical study and the
exercise of the virtue of practical wisdom to interpret it well.
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Furthermore, this perspective implies that creatures are to be seen as morally
considerable to the extent their species manifests consciousness and mental
complexity, and some ought to be seen in some circumstances as more considerable
than others. All of the animals simulated in analogs are vertebrates and are therefore
likely to possess some degree of mental complexity and consciousness.[3] Such
animals, e.g. cows, pigs, foxes, and chickens can be spared death and much suffering
by replacing their dominant forms of use with morally acceptable ones.

Turner claims that from a deontological or right-based perspective, the wearing of
realistic clothing animal analogs or thriftshop leatherwear is no better, morally, than
wearing synthetic alternatives.[4] I take this to be one of her central claims, and I
disagree with it for two reasons. Firstly, because of the ontological distinction
between animal-based commodities and their simulacra. Secondly, because of the
importance of setting an example in our actual consumer choices.

On the first point, it is precisely because I take vertebrate animals to possess at
least basic rights not to be harmed unnecessarily that I hold animal analogs to be a far
preferable choice to their natural inspirations. It is by no means clear that animals
have, as Turner suggests, a right not to be represented as resources.[5] A non-absolutist
approach to rights of the sort I would wish to defend allows us to view them as linked
to their bearer’s most fundamental interests without rigidity. It may very well be the
case that the most fundamental rights of some animals i.e. the right not to be caused to
suffer unnecessarily or to be killed, are best maintained by allowing for the
sublimation of our strong desires for the products of their suffering and death.
Furthermore, this sublimation through the use of animal analogs may be more
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effective in satisfying human aesthetic preferences than a third option, which is to use
neither analogs nor their animal inspirations. Doing so may not sit well with
deontological absolutists, or rights purists, but this is where a modest
consequentialism has a role to play.

Without compromising the most fundamental of rights, it would serve us well to
consider the plausibility that people will convert to vegetarianism if well-designed
analogs were more widely available, and actively promoted. Also to be contemplated
is the likelihood of people being less inclined to think that converting to a vegetarian
diet would cause them to “miss out”, if some of their favourite pleasures could be
satisfied in the future by the use of analogs.[6] Turner denies this likelihood
explicitly,[7] claiming that food analogs in particular are more likely to lead to
backsliding than to maintaining a vegetarian diet because of the intractability of eating
habits. I suspect that there is no empirical data on this matter either way, and it would
be of social-scientific and philosophical interest to provide it in the form of a
controlled study.

On the second point, that of setting an example in one’s ethical and consumer
choices, there is much to be said about the value of individuals, however much in the
minority, explaining to those around them why they have purchased product x rather
than product y. This has been a cornerstone of environmentalist thinking for some
time, and it applies to ethical issues in general. As members of mass societies, we
cannot reach all of our fellow citizens. However, consumer choice can be a powerful
symbolic and economic factor in either converting others to one’s perspective, or at
least generating valuable discussion of its justifications within one’s own social circle.
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Because of this fact, I think that from a consequentialist perspective, whether
utilitarian or non-utilitarian, used or thriftshop leather remains problematical. It is
likely that vegetarians will stand accused of hypocrisy in wearing such animal-based
commodities, and that it will open them up to various ad hominem attacks in debates
and discussions.[8]

The Moral and Aesthetic Properties of Animal Analogs

What counts primarily in ethical evaluation, in my view, is what things are, not
what they resemble. In this sense, there is a critical link to be made between ontology
and ethics, regardless of one’s preferred decision procedure. Keeping this distinction
in mind will clarify the distinction between the ethical and aesthetic evaluation of
commodities, both of which are important in human life. Although there are some
extreme cases in which we ought to give pride of place to ethical evaluation over
aesthetic evaluation,[9] this need not imply a refusal to recognize the real and distinct
value of aesthetic preference in human life. Attempting to accommodate these two
realms of value to each other is an important project in its own right. This is a
question that extends well beyond the question of animal analogs into the debate in
aesthetics between moralists and aestheticists.

Briefly, I take my own position on these issues to be a moderate form of
aestheticism. By that designation, I mean to claim some degree of separation between
aesthetic and ethical judgments and values, rather than a sternly moralistic and
potentially censorial approach to the arts. The latter approach would condemn or even
seek to prohibit artefacts and simulacra that might offend the moral principles held by
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their potential percipients. Moderate aestheticism does not imply that it would always
be wrong to ban a given artefact or type of artefact on moral grounds, merely that this
is not justified prima facie, and that the burden of proof lies squarely with the critic
who must show that it is very likely to produce great harm. It also takes aesthetic
value to be fundamental to human life, and manifested in a wide range of our
practices and habits. Prohibiting or renouncing a source of aesthetic appreciation may
be at times justified, but doing so would involve a more than minor sacrifice to our
quality of life. Valued artefacts in the fine and applied arts are products of human
creativity and expressiveness. In the case of the applied arts, they are a response to
human wants and needs for both functionality and perceptual qualities, some of them
aesthetic. As such, they are not to be repressed lightly.

Sublimation and Strong Human Preferences

Humans have been using animal-based commodities for millennia and animal
analogs for many centuries. The oldest animal analogs known in history are the
recipes to be found in Buddhist cookbooks that date back to medieval China.[10] These
venerable substitutes for meat[11] were promoted in order to reduce the suffering and
deaths of countless animals in the production of meat, long before the formulation of
theories in defense of animal welfare by Western philosophers. They continue to be
featured prominently in Chinese and Buddhist vegetarian restaurants around the
world.

Much more recent are synthetic substitutes for fur—they were first produced en
masse in the mid to late 1940s[12], and have continued to be sold ever since. They have
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attracted some attention in recent years, due to the decision of some fashion models
not to display and promote animal fur while continuing to work with synthetics.
Although the original motivation for the development of these synthetics was likely
economic, given the generally high cost of animal fur commodities, they are now
consumed widely as a morally preferable substitute for their natural counterparts.

The common feature of all these animal analogs is their widespread appeal as
ethically preferable substitutes for animal-based commodities that require the pain and
deaths of numerous creatures. The fact that they resemble their original inspirations,
sometimes to a striking degree, is due in part to the aesthetic preferences of their
consumers for e.g. the taste of chicken and the look of leather. In some cases it is also
due to these consumers’ legitimate desire not to miss aspects of their cultural and
social practices. It is hard to overestimate the power of cultural and deeply ingrained
lifestyle habits and practices on our behaviour. These habits and practices might
include gastronomical activities such as participating in a neighbourhood barbecue or
having a snack at a sporting event, or fashion choices such as dressing appropriately
for a professional meeting at which canvas sneakers would not be considered
appropriate attire.

On the issue of fashion, the philosophical implications of clothing raise a number
of separate and interesting issues.[13] The importance of fashion tends to be
underestimated by many academics. This is, I suspect, due to both the lack of a formal
dress code in this sphere of work, and to a widespread belief that it is trivial and
linked to luxury and frivolity. However, in many social environments, for better or
worse, dress codes are considered important. Consider the case indicated above of a
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professional meeting in the corporate sector. Although some companies are casual in
their approach to office attire, others are far more formal and conservative. In such
environments, allowances may or may not be made for conscientious dissent in one’s
overall style of presentation. It should be granted that a certain number of people will
be justified in choosing to make their careers in such areas, for reasons related to
interest and ability. It would therefore be unreasonable to insist that they violate their
local dress codes unnecessarily, and thereby potentially damage their careers.
Clothing analogs are an ethical and presentable alternative.

Consider as well the case of certain professionals, such as police officers who
must be in uniform while on duty. If part of their uniform consists of black leather
shoes of a certain texture and appearance, then these can be duplicated quite easily
with synthetic materials. Similar considerations apply to a wide range of occupations,
such as fire fighters, hospital orderlies, airline pilots and military personnel. Such
codes have been challenged on religious grounds,[14] but not always successfully, and
to much stress and unwanted publicity on the part of the plaintiffs. So, a further
benefit of clothing animal analogs is their desirability for ethical vegetarians who
must satisfy uniform dress code requirements, as well as the satisfaction of their
subjective clothing preferences.

Concerning food preferences, whether for reasons of culture and/or evolution,
most humans have a strong liking for the taste, appearance and texture of meat.[15] I
am inclined to believe that this is primarily a matter of social conditioning, but that
does not eliminate the undeniable fact that meat has always been and will likely
remain one of the most common choices for nourishment in most societies and
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cultures. One might take the defiant and radical attitude that this should be considered
a massive moral error and that it is universally required to consume nothing that
resembles meat. or animal skin. I take this to be Turner’s view when she states of
what she terms “the primitive pleasure” of animal-based commodities and the
defenses of their animal analogs:
It is not, one might argue, merely the look or touch or feel or taste or smell of these
items that produces the effect. These properties can be more or less reproduced with
current technology. Arguably, the very knowledge of what they are contributes an
essential element to the entire experience. …the possibility should nevertheless be
considered by vegetarians who put up such defenses [that] they are post-hoc attempts
to justify acting on the same desire nonvegetarians putatively act on to consume, in
one way or another, animal flesh.”
And in footnote ten, attached to this statement, we read:
…strict vegetarians in particular would want to maintain rational control of any such
motives or desires. (My italics).[16]
Or, one might attempt to sublimate[17] these powerful desires and preferences in an
ethically desirable manner. This would involve a frank recognition of the powerful
attractions of meat and animal skin without indulging them in what ought to be
considered an unethical fashion. Rather, on this account, the basic desires and
preferences are to be channelled into ethically acceptable activities, involving a
replacement of the original stimulus or inspiration with well-designed analogs. It is
their verisimilitude itself that commends them to the ethically conscious consumer.

A key implication of the advocacy of sublimation is the belief that it is often better
to divert urges and preferences than to suppress them. Squeamishness about our most
basic and powerful desires will neither improve our ethics nor our minds, given the
likely fact that a sudden dissociation between pleasure and meat eating on the part of
a huge majority of humanity is a utopian goal. It is thus preferable to advocate animal
analogs as an acceptable substitute than to either maintain the status quo, provide a
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less attractive substitute, or to deny a powerful and near universal attraction. I believe
that the same ought to be said concerning the unlikelihood of a similar dissociation
between beauty, and fur and leather. Fake meat can be tasty and fake fur and leather
can be enticing, without violating any creature’s rights or welfare. It is their
perceptual and aesthetic qualities that provide the thrills, not knowing that they are the
products of a slaughterhouse. If anything, one might wonder what the effect upon
consumers would be if the grim origins of their animal-based commodities were to be
made plainer to them. …

Relatedly, an analogy might be drawn to kosher meat analogs that taste, look, and
feel rather like pork. Many rabbinical authorities would not hesitate to certify them
kosher, even though they resemble the flesh of an animal prohibited in Orthodox
Judaism.[18] This would seem the correct attitude, in that it involves giving priority to
substance over form in respecting dietary laws. The same approach is taken by
Chinese and other Buddhists in their acceptance and consumption of mock meat.

To further illustrate the value of sublimation, consider a very improbable future
event in which a sort of International Paintball Competition (IPC) would come to
serve as a substitute for warfare. This would be different in form from the Olympic
Games, which were originally conceived in part as a replacement for war when they
were revived in the 1890s by Pierre De Coubertin. The difference here is the
obviously far greater resemblance of paintball to the real activity of shooting people
on the battlefield. Let us assume further that where the Olympics failed dismally to
sublimate our desire to do violence to others, IPC would succeed. The very logical
possibility of such an obviously desirable substitution to the suffering and slaughter of
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war raises a question: why would one not wish to encourage an analogous
replacement of animal analogs for animal-based commodities, in order to reduce
animal suffering and slaughter? As to the critic of IPC who might reply that people
are not beings to be shot in any way, I would be tempted to reply: “Better IPC than
World War III”.

A useful comparison might also be drawn to the use of software simulacra of
eviscerated animals in simulating dissection. Here strikingly realistic images, likely
based on original animal models, are offered as analogs to the real thing i.e. killing
and eviscerating live animals. Given the importance of learning anatomy in medical
and other life science education, is it wrong to display virtually identical simulacra of
their exposed viscera in order to replace the original animals? The search for analogs
and alternatives to in vivo models is an important activity of the anti-vivisectionist
movement, and the potential for saving countless animal lives would seem worth
bracketing residual concerns about the original source of software images in
simulated dissections.[19] A similar concern about animal life ought to be manifested
in other areas of human activity, and animal analogs have a role to play there as well.

Conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to explore the implications of using animal analogs
for food and clothing, using Susan Turner’s 2005 article on the topic as a springboard
for general discussion. This has led to a defense of replacing animal-based
commodities with aesthetically valuable analogs so as to sublimate some of our most
basic desires effectively, and without violating the fundamental rights of their animal
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inspirations. Given a reasonable degree of consequentialism, along with a respect for
the lives and well-being of vertebrate animals, it is important that alternatives to
animal-based commodities be found. Furthermore, because we are creatures of habit
and practice, as well as aesthetically discriminating beings, such alternatives ought to
be both readily incorporable into our ways of life and attractively designed. These
alternatives are likely to be most effective as replacements if they allow for the
sublimation rather than the repression of some of our most basic and deeply ingrained
desires and preferences, in the pursuit of a more humane and wise relationship
between humanity and the animal world. Coming to terms with ourselves sometimes
involves recognizing controversial desires and tendencies that are perennial, and are
not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Animal analogs have a role to play in
doing so in a manner that is both aesthetically commendable and ethically blameless.
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